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Acc idental ly  about me 
 
Abstract: Why are de se mental states essential? What exactly is their de se-ness 
needed to do? I argue that it is needed to fend off accidentalness. If certain 
beliefs – e.g. nociceptive or proprioceptive or introspective beliefs – were not de 
se, then any truth they achieved would be too accidental for the subject to count 
as knowing. If certain intentions – intentions that are in play whenever we 
intentionally do anything – were not de se, then any satisfaction they achieved 
would be too accidental for the subject to count as intentionally acting. How 
states hook onto their referent is relevant in a systematic but underexplored way 
to whether they non-accidentally achieve their aim – truth in the case of beliefs, 
satisfaction in the case of intentions. In the relevant cases, the way of hooking on 
to a referent needed to avoid being accidental is the way a de se state hooks on to 




De se states seem to play an essential role in certain cases of knowledge and intentional 
action (hereafter, action). It’s easy to feel the pull of the cases that seem to show this. It’s 
surprisingly difficult to say what explains this. This paper offers an explanation.  
 
I begin with two cases:  
 
Cognitive: Ruth lacks any non-trivial identity knowledge concerning herself (i.e. she 
doesn’t know anything like ‘I am Ruth’ even if she does know trivialities like ‘I 
am me’ or ‘Ruth is Ruth’). She is in a particular mental state: a state of pain. She 
attends to this pain via nociception – i.e. the normal way of observing pain that 
doesn’t involve observing pain-behavior. As a result, something cognitive 
happens. She forms a belief whose truth-condition is:  <Ruth, is in pain>. 
 
Conative: Ruth lacks any non-trivial identity knowledge concerning herself. She 
has just moved a step backward. This resulted from something conative 
happening. She formed an intention whose satisfaction-condition is <Ruth, takes 
a step backward>.  
 
There are many different beliefs whose truth-condition is <Ruth, is in pain>. Anyone 
who has been exposed to relevant works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis will suspect that, 
in relation to Cognitive, a belief it would be most natural for Ruth (a monoglot English-
speaker) to express by uttering the sentence ‘I am in pain’ – a de se belief – is somehow 
especially relevant. 1 
 
It takes a bit of care to say what the special relevance consists in. The belief nociception 
causes Ruth to form might not be of the ‘I am in pain’ sort. Perhaps attending to her pain 
causes Ruth to look up and catch sight of a doctor’s clipboard on which is written ‘Ruth 
is in pain’. Ruth forms a ‘Ruth is in pain’ belief, and her attending to her pain was a cause 
of her doing so.  But one thing that seems harder to imagine is the following: Ruth forms 
a belief that is knowledge, on the basis of nociception, but the belief in question is not of 
the ‘I am in pain’ sort. De se belief seems essential for nociceptive knowledge. 
                                                        
1 See Castañeda (1967), Perry (1979), Lewis (1979). 
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This raises an explanatory question. The name ‘Kentucky Fried Chicken’ builds in an 
obvious reference to chicken. It’s not surprising that one would expect to be able to buy 
chicken in a Kentucky Fried Chicken shop. In setting Cognitive up, I glossed nociception as 
the ‘normal way of observing pain that doesn’t involve observing pain-behavior’. This 
gloss does not build in any reference to ‘I’. If a belief that it would be natural to express 
using ‘I’ really is essential for nociceptive knowledge we should expect there to be 
something that explains why that is. If we can’t give an explanation of why that is, we 
might even reopen the question of whether it is. But even supposing that isn’t a serious 
possibility – e.g. because doing so involves violating clear-cut intuitions we have about a 
case like Cognitive – the purely explanatory question remains pressing.  
 
Conative also raises an explanatory question. There are different intentions with the 
satisfaction-condition <Ruth, takes a step backward>. But, of these, the one Ruth would 
most naturally express by uttering the sentence ‘I will take a step backward’ – a de se 
intention – seems especially relevant. There are ways of fleshing out the details of the 
case, so that the intention Ruth formed turns out not to have been of this sort. Perhaps 
what happened is that Ruth formed an intention whose content she would report by 
uttering the sentence ‘Ruth will take a step backward’, one she expects to satisfy by 
calling Ruth up and giving her an order. The temerity she feels herself to be showing in 
forming this intention unnerves her, and her nerves show themselves in her 
unintentionally taking a step backwards. But one thing that is much harder to imagine is 
the following: Ruth intentionally took a step backward but the only intention on which she 
acted is of the ‘Ruth will take a step backward’ not the ‘I will take a step backward’ sort. 
This cries out for an explanation. The notion of intentionally taking a step backward does not 
build in any obvious reference to ‘I’. So why should Ruth’s intentionally taking a step 
backward depend on having her having an intention that she would most naturally 
express with ‘I’? 
 
In this paper, I answer both questions – which strike me as parallel – in a parallel way: 
the first by reference to a non-accidental truth condition on knowledge, the second by 
reference to a non-accidental satisfaction condition on action.2 Both non-accidentality 
conditions are sensitive to how a state hooks onto its referent – to what I will call 
‘hyperintensional profile’. That makes the following strategy possible. We stipulate that 
we are dealing, in a given case, with knowledge or with intentional action. We infer that 
the associated non-accidentality condition is satisfied. We use that to reverse engineer 
what the hyperintensional profile of the knowledge-constituting belief, or action-
producing intention, must be. In particular, we use it to explain why the required 
hyperintensional profile, if Ruth is to know in a case like Cognitive or to act in a case like 
Conative, is the very hyperintensional profile that de se states have.  
 
What makes a case of knowledge ‘like Cognitive’ or a case of action ‘like Conative’? I’ll 
argue that the point about Cognitive generalizes to all beliefs that are based on single-object 
relations – knowledge-yielding relations that one can only stand in to oneself and one’s 
own properties. 3 Other plausible examples of single-object relations are proprioception, 
                                                        
2 See Williamson (forthcoming) for the more general idea that knowledge and action are duals.  
3 Readers familiar with the notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) may wonder 
whether the question about scope could also be answered using that notion. Can we also say that a case is 
‘like Cognitive’ if it involves knowledge constituted by a belief that is IEM relative to ‘I’? I think that would 
be fine, since I think that beliefs are IEM relative to ‘I’ when and because they are based on single-object 
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kinesthesia, and introspection. I’ll argue that the point about Conative generalizes not to a 
subset of intentional actions but to all of them: one needs a de se intention whenever one 
intentionally does anything. So there is a contrast in scope between the two 
generalizations from Cognitive and Conative. I’ll argue this contrast in scope is explained by 
the fact that all our intentions impact the world by causing movements of our bodies 
(bodily action), or events in our streams of consciousness (mental action). By contrast, 
not all our beliefs involve single-object relations.  
 
Before setting out the sections the paper, I provide a bit more detail on two key terms – 
‘hyperintensional profile’ and ‘de se’. 
 
A ‘hyperintensional profile’, as I use the term, is an answer to the question, asked about a 
mental or linguistic representation, ‘Why does it have the object it has? (Equivalently: 
‘Why is it about what it is about?’ or ‘Why does it refer to what it refers to?’ ‘Why do its 
truth-/satisfaction- conditions involve the thing they do?’). Someone might have three 
different beliefs about Ruth, one about her ‘as Ruth’, another about her ‘as the author of 
Biosemantics’, and another about her ‘as that woman’. There are three different 
‘hyperintensional profiles’ in that there are three different answers to the question, asked 
of each of the three beliefs, ‘Why does it have Ruth as its object?’, each mentioning a 
different property Ruth has. If you prefer a different label for the same notion – e.g. 
‘reference-fixing story’ – feel free to substitute it instead.  
A ‘de se’ state, as I use the term, is a representational mental state that has some special 
connection with the first-person pronoun, in English the word ‘I’ (I’ve glossed the 
connection by saying that they are most naturally expressed using that word). This word-
oriented definition of a type of mental state leaves almost everything about the nature of 
de se states open. Ruth Millikan, who defends the view that ‘the whole genre of indexicals 
is simply missing from thought’ (1990:725), can accept that some of our states are de se in 
this sense. The phrase ‘special connection with “I”’ is in fact borrowed from her (see 
1990: 732). 
If one thinks de se states have other properties in addition to their connection to the first-
person pronoun – e.g. if one thinks they have a certain hyperintensional profile – one 
will want to give an argument. There is in fact a standard and highly natural view about 
the hyperintensional profile of de se states: they are about their objects because those 
objects are their subjects.4  The property of having this hyperintensional profile is the 
property of de se states that is crucial to my explanation of why they are essential. Part of 
the work of the paper is to show that they do have that property.  
 
In (I), I argue, using examples that have nothing to do with the de se, that there is a non-
accidental truth condition on knowledge that has a hyperintensional aspect, captured by a 
principle I call Accord. In (II), I use Accord in explaining why Ruth’s nociceptive belief in 
Cognitive must be de se if it is to be knowledge. The point generalizes to all beliefs based 
on single-object relations. In (III), I extend the same kind of consideration from 
knowledge to action, in explaining why Ruth’s intention in Conative must be de se if she is 
to intentionally take a step backwards. The point generalizes to all intentional actions. 
Section (IV) is comparative. It argues that the non-accidentality considerations developed 
                                                                                                                                                              
relations. However, it is only the notion of a single-object relation that does explanatory work in this paper. 
For discussion of IEM, see the essays in Prosser and Recanati (2012).  
4 E.g. Campbell (1994), Kaplan (1989), O’ Brien (2007), Perry (1979) and Peacocke (2008) all hold that de se 
thoughts are governed by a rule according which any token of a de se thought refers to its subject.  
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in the earlier sections of the paper rule out positions about the de se defended by Ruth 
Millikan, Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, and Ofra Magidor.5  
 
(I) The non-accidental truth requirement on knowledge is sensitive to hyperintensional profile: Accord 
 
The following is an intuitive and widely accepted idea about knowledge:  
 
Non-accidental truth: If one knows, then it is not accidental that one believes truly. 
 
E.g. if I form a true belief (‘It’s 3pm!’) about what time it is on the basis of the time the 
hands of a stopped clock are showing, my belief is not knowledge, because it is accidental 
that I believe truly.6 It’s an accident, for example, that the clock’s hands didn’t stop a 
minute later, or earlier, and that my relying on it for the time didn’t cause me to form a 
false belief.  
 
There are different proposals about how to capture more precisely the rough starting 
idea of a non-accidental truth requirement. One might say that knowledge requires belief 
whose truth is not lucky.7 Or one might say that knowledge requires belief that is reliably 
true.8  Or one might say that knowledge requires safe belief, where safety involves 
avoiding falsehood in all nearby worlds.9 For my purposes here, any of these would have 
been fine. I stick with non-accidental truth.10   
 
Suppose that I violate the requirement – I form a true belief but I don’t gain knowledge 
because it is, in the relevant sense, accidental that I believe truly. An important thing to 
recall is that the scenarios that make this so may be ones in which I form a false belief 
that has a different intension from the belief I in fact formed. E.g., suppose I’m asked 
whether 71*35 is 2485 (correct) or 2585 (incorrect). I form the belief that it is 2485, on 
the basis of a coin-toss. Intuitively, I don’t thereby come to know that 71*35 is 2485, 
because it is accidental that I believe truly. But the scenarios that make this so can’t be 
ones in which 71*35 isn’t 2485. There aren’t any scenarios like that since it is a necessary 
truth that 71*35 is 2485. The relevant scenarios are rather ones in which I rely on the 
same coin-toss basis as I in fact relied on and this leads me to form a belief with a 
different intension – e.g. the intension that 71*35 is 2585 – that is false. 11 
 
Forming a belief about the answer to a multiplication question on the basis of a coin-toss 
is a bit bizarre. It might be suspected that the point the case illustrates is only relevant to 
some marginal class of beliefs. But that would be a mistake, as a case of Richard 
Kimberly Heck’s brings out. In it the subject, Tony, forms a belief in response to the 
testimony of someone else, Alex, about Eric Blair (a.k.a. George Orwell):  
 
Suppose Eric Blair were to become amnesiac and check himself into a hospital. 
The doctor, Tony, deciding that she needs to have some name by which to call 
him, dubs him "George Orwell". And suppose further that Alex says—not 
intending to refer to Tony's patient—"George Orwell wrote 1984" and that Tony 
                                                        
5 See Millikan (1990, 2001), Cappelen and Dever (2013) and Magidor (2015). 
6 See Russell (1948:170).    
7 See Pritchard (2005). 
8 See Goldman (1976). 
9 See Williamson (2000) and Sosa (1999) 
10 See Unger (1968). 
11 See Pritchard (2012:182) for further discussion. 
 5
forms, in reaction to Alex's assertion, the belief she would express to other 
members of her staff as "George Orwell wrote 1984". This belief is true: Tony's 
new patient happens to be Eric Blair, that is, "the other" George Orwell. But 
surely it would not count as knowledge, even if Alex knows that George Orwell 
wrote 1984 (1995:95).12  
 
Intuitively, the case is not one of knowledge because the truth of Tony’s ‘Orwellmy patient 
wrote 1984’ belief is accidental. Its being accidental cannot turn on its being accidental 
that the intension the belief in fact has is true. For there is a different belief with the very 
same intension that Tony could form and that would be knowledge. This is the belief 
Tony would express by saying ‘Orwell wrote 1984’, intending to refer to whoever Alex is 
talking about. Heck’s passage doesn’t explicitly say whether Tony has in fact also formed 
this belief. But, assuming she has, it seems like knowledge. It isn’t merely accidentally 
true.  
 
I think that what makes one of the two beliefs accidentally true, and the other not, is a 
difference in what I have been calling hyperintensional profile: i.e. a difference in why 
each of the beliefs has the object that is has. One belief has an appropriate 
hyperintensional profile, and the other does not. Accord is the general claim I want to 
defend about what makes for appropriateness of hyperintensional profile: 
 
Accord: If S gains knowledge of some thing by standing in a relation, R, to it, then 
the hyperintensional profile of the belief that constitutes that knowledge doesn’t 
make it accidental that the belief is about something that S stands in R to. 13 
 
Accord doesn’t exactly trip off the tongue. Before arguing for it, let me clarify how it 
applies to Heck’s case.  
 
S is Tony. R is whatever the relevant knowledge-yielding relation is when someone gains 
knowledge through testimony. Perhaps it is something like ‘gaining testimony about x 
from one whose testimony expresses knowledge’. For brevity, I’ll just say ‘gaining 
testimony about’.   
 
Consider Tony’s ‘Orwellmypatient wrote 1984’ belief. The hyperintensional profile the belief 
has is as follows: it picks out a certain person because they are the patient Tony labeled 
‘Orwell’. Its having this hyperintensional profile does make it accidental that it picks out 
someone that Tony has gained testimony about. The relevant accident is that Tony’s 
patient is the very person who Alex is talking about.  
 
Consider Tony’s ‘OrwellwhoeverAlexistalkingabout wrote 1984’ belief. The hyperintensional profile 
the belief has is as follows: it picks out a certain person because they are the person Alex 
is talking about. Its having this hyperintensional profile does not make it accidental that it 
will pick out someone that Tony has gained testimony about. On the contrary, it ensures 
that the belief is about the very person Alex is offering testimony about.  
 
The argument for Accord is inference to the best explanation. Alex says ‘Orwell wrote 
1984’. There is a belief that Tony could form that would be knowledge – the belief that 
picks out Orwell because he is the person Alex is talking about. There is a belief that Tony 
                                                        
12 See Heck (1995).  
13 See Campbell (1994: 137) for a somewhat similar principle. 
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could form that wouldn’t be knowledge – the belief that picks out Orwell because he is, 
as Tony would put it, ‘my patient’. I claim what distinguishes them, what best explains why 
one counted as only accidentally true, and not a case of knowledge, and the other 
doesn’t, is that one belief violates Accord and the other does not.  
This argument for Accord involves a case of testimony. But it need not have done. Much 
of our knowledge of the world comes from standing in potentially knowledge-yielding 
relations to things – e.g. hearing about them (testimony), seeing them, smelling them, 
hearing them, detecting them with a particle accelerator. These are genuine relations.  If 
one sees a, and a is b, then one sees b. Yet, even if a is b, one can know a is F without 
knowing b is F. When one stands in a potentially knowledge-yielding relation to 
something, actually getting the knowledge the relation makes available requires forming a 
belief with an appropriate hyperintensional profile. Accord says what makes for 
appropriateness of hyperintensional profile.  
I’ll end this section’s defense of Accord by considering a worry, a reply, a follow up worry, 
and a follow up reply.  
The worry is that there is a whiff of paradox about appealing to the idea of an accident in 
relation to Tony’s failure to know. One way of describing what is supposed to be 
accidental is as follows: if Tony were to form the belief  ‘Orwellmypatient is 
OrwellwhoeverAlexistalkingabout)’ its truth would be accidental. But that belief has a necessary 
intension. At least in that sense, its truth couldn’t be further from being accidental.  
 
The reply is that we should refuse to identify the kind of non-accidental truth that 
consists in a belief having a necessary intension with the kind of non-accidental truth that 
is required by knowledge. This already was necessary in relation to the ‘71*35 is 2585’ 
example (and, perhaps less obviously, in relation to the stopped clock example, if we 
think that the intension of my ‘It’s 3pm’ belief is <3pm, 3pm, is identical to>).  
 
The follow-up worry is that this reply makes the non-accidental truth requirement seem 
insubstantial. Perhaps the requirement cannot be understood independently of the 
notion of knowledge. In particular, perhaps Accord – which is intended to capture the 
hyperintensional aspect of the non-accidental truth requirement – cannot be understood 
independently of the notion of knowledge. In that case, can we really ever explain verdicts 
about knowledge by reference to the non-accidental truth requirement, or by reference to 
Accord? 
 
Consider a fake barn case in which I believe ‘That is a barn’, of the only real barn in a 
county full of fakes. Is my belief knowledge? Is it accidentally true? Arguably our 
uncertainty about the second question tracks uncertainty about the first. If we end up 
saying the belief is not a case of knowledge, it isn’t very informative to say that it isn’t 
knowledge because it only accidentally true. If we’d gone for the view that the belief was 
knowledge, we would have said that it is non-accidentally true in the relevant sense.14  
 
But this isn’t the only kind of case. There are also the clear cases of merely accidentally 
true belief of the sort that provide the original motivation for the requirement. I look at a 
stopped clock at 3pm and form a true belief (‘It’s 3pm’). The belief isn’t knowledge 
                                                        
14 See Hawthorne and Gendler (2005) for a discussion of the instability of our intuitions around fake barn 
cases.  See also Williamson (2000:100). 
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because it is an accident that I looked at the clock at the very time the hands are 
displaying. That this is accidental is something that can be appreciated independently of 
any verdicts about knowledge. In the stopped clock case, it really is informative to say I 
didn’t know because the truth of my belief was accidental.  
 
I submit that the same is true in Heck’s case. Tony’s ‘Orwellmy patient wrote 1984’ belief 
isn’t knowledge, because it is merely accidentally true. Moreover, we can dig down a bit 
and say something about the aspect of Tony’s belief in virtue of which it is only 
accidentally true. The belief is only accidentally true despite the presence of a potentially 
knowledge-yielding relation (gaining testimony about) between Tony and the object of 
her belief (Orwell). What makes her belief merely accidentally true is that the 
hyperintensional profile of her belief makes it accidental that the belief is about someone 
she stands in this relation to. The violation of Accord really does explain the failure to 
know. 
 
Accord is the hyperintensional face of the non-accidental truth requirement on 
knowledge. It’s not the face we first think of when we think of that requirement but it is 
a face the requirement indisputably has. The next section uses Accord to explain why 
some knowledge is essentially de se.  
 
(II) Accord and de se knowledge  
 
I repeat Cognitive from above.  
 
Cognitive: Ruth lacks any non-trivial identity knowledge concerning herself. She is 
in a particular mental state: a state of pain. She attends to this pain via 
nociception. As a result, something cognitive happens. She forms a belief whose 
truth-condition is:  <Ruth, is in pain>.  
 
I stipulate that we are dealing with a version of Cognitive in which the belief Ruth forms 
constitutes nociceptive knowledge. If so, the belief must satisfy Accord. So we can try to 
use Accord to reverse-engineer its hyperintensional profile.  
 
I’ll use ‘t is in pain’ as a way of referring to Ruth’s belief. I’ll first consider the following 
proposal: ‘t’ picks out Ruth because Ruth has the property of being Dever’s favorite author. 
No doubt this is a ridiculous proposal. I doubt anyone in the literature on nociceptive 
knowledge has ever given the property of being Dever’s favorite author any serious 
attention. I still think it is illuminating to say explicitly why the proposal can’t be right. 
That’s because I am going to argue that the problem is that the proposal violates Accord. I 
further argue that the only way to remove the violation is to accept that the 
hyperintensional profile of ‘t’ is as follows: ‘t’ picks Ruth out because she is the subject of 
the state in which ‘t’ figures. As noted earlier, this is to accept that the hyperintensional 
profile of ‘t’ is the very hyperintensional profile that de se states are standardly assumed to 
have. 
 
That permits an argument in support of the standard assumption about the 
hyperintensional profile of de se states. We have a strong intuition that, if the belief Ruth 
forms in Cognitive is nociceptive knowledge, it will be a de se belief about Ruth – i.e. one 
she would express with ‘I’. I am just about to give an argument based on Accord to show 
that, if the belief Ruth forms in Cognitive is nociceptive knowledge, it will be about Ruth 
because she is its subject. These two together imply that a de se belief of Ruth’s is about 
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her because she is its subject. That is, they imply exactly what the standard view about de 
se beliefs says.  
 
With the standard view in place, we can give our explanation of why de se belief is 
essential for nociceptive knowledge. A belief with the hyperintensional profile de se 
beliefs are standardly taken to have is essential for nociceptive knowledge because only a 
belief with that hyperintensional profile is compatible with Accord. A de se belief is 
essential for nociceptive knowledge because – the standard view about de se beliefs being 
correct – de se beliefs are the beliefs with the hyperintensional profile de se beliefs are 
standardly taken to have.  
 
I turn now to the argument that Ruth’s ‘t’-belief needs to be about her because she is its 
subject if it is to be compatible with Accord.  
 
Consider first the Dever’s favorite author proposal about ‘t’. On this proposal, Ruth’s ‘t’-
belief picks out someone because they have the property of being Dever’s favorite author. 
This makes it accidental that the belief is about a person whose pain Ruth is related to via 
nociception. The relevant accident is that Ruth is related to Dever’s favorite author via 
nociception. So, Ruth’s belief isn’t knowledge. This is despite the fact that she stands in a 
potentially knowledge-yielding relation (nociception) to the person who the belief is in 
fact about. In this, she resembles Tony, who stands in a potentially knowledge yielding 
relation (gaining testimony about) to the person who her ‘Orwellmypatient’ belief is in fact 
about. In both cases, a potentially knowledge-yielding relation obtains between the 
subject and the object of their belief. In both cases, the subject gains true belief but not 
knowledge. This is so in Tony’s case, in fact. It is so in Ruth’s case, on the supposition 
that ‘t’ picks her out because she has the property of being Dever’s favorite author. But 
remember – we stipulated that this is a case in which Ruth’s belief is knowledge. We can 
conclude by reductio that the proposal about ‘t’ is incorrect.  
 
Hooking onto Ruth because she has the property of being Dever’s favorite author is just one 
hyperintensional profile ‘t’ could have. There are many others, corresponding to the 
many properties Ruth alone has. Here are three more of those:  
 
Being the author of ‘White Queen Psychology and other essays’. 
 
Being the fusion of a certain egg, E, and a certain sperm, S.  
 
Being picked out in a baptism that is the origin of a name-using practice involving a certain 
name pronounced ‘Ruth Millikan’.  
 
Who someone’s favorite author is depends on accidents of formation. Perhaps Dever 
could easily have liked Eric Hobsbawm better than he liked Ruth Millikan, if he’d signed 
up to a History rather than a Philosophy survey course at the age of 18. In some sense, it 
is far less of an accident – much more part of who Ruth is – that Ruth is the author of 
White Queen Psychology and other essays. It took a mind of a certain cast to write that book, 
and Ruth’s mind had that cast. To the maximal extent possible, it is part of who Ruth is 
that she is the fusion of E and S. That fusion is her origin. If origins are essential, it is her 
essence. On one view about the individuation of proper names, proper names have their 
references essentially. If that view is right, only Ruth could have been picked out in a 
baptism that is the origin of a name-using practice involving the relevant name  
pronounced ‘Ruth Millikan’. 
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Each of the three specified properties corresponds to a different proposal about how ‘t’ 
picks Ruth out. Does any make for a more plausible proposal, one that stands a better 
chance of not violating Accord? No. The problem is that the notion of accidentalness on 
which Ruth’s having one of these properties is less of an accident than having the 
property of being Dever’s favorite author is purely metaphysical. For example, suppose 
Ruth were to respond to nociception by forming the belief ‘The fusion of E and S is in 
pain’. It would still be an accident that the person her belief is about is someone she 
stands in the relation of nociception to. Perhaps, if we like, we can trace this back to the 
possibility of ‘E’ hooking onto a different egg, one that wasn’t the egg Ruth came from, 
or ‘S’ onto a different sperm. But, the main point is that, epistemically, it can be 
accidental that a person has the metaphysically essential properties they have just as, 
epistemically, it can be accidental that a number (e.g. 2485) has the metaphysically 
essential properties it has (e.g. being the product of 71 and 35).  
 
There is a pattern in the failure of the proposals we’ve considered: the lack of a 
connection between nociception and the hyperintensional profile ‘t’ is being proposed to 
have.  
 
That connection seems restored on the proposal that ‘t’ has the hyperintensional 
proposal that de se states are standardly taken to have. On that proposal, ‘t’ picks out 
Ruth because she has the following property: 
 
 Being the subject of the state in which ‘t’ figures.  
 
Suppose one wanted to say that, on this proposal as well, Accord is violated. One would 
have to argue that the hyperintensional profile of ‘t’ – picking out Ruth because she is the 
subject of the belief – makes it accidental that it is about a person whose pain Ruth is related 
to via nociception. But, on the face of it, that is false. Nociception – the normal way of 
observing pain that does not involve observing pain-behavior – is a relation that a subject 
can only stand in to herself and her own pains. One can easily know about other peoples’ 
pains, but not via nociception.  So there really does seem to be a connection between 
nociception and the hyperintensional profile of Ruth’s belief on the de se proposal about 
‘t’, in contrast to all the non de se proposals. 
 
The key fact about nociception that did work in this argument is the fact that it is a 
knowledge-yielding relation one can only stand in to oneself and one’s own properties. 
I’ll summarise this by saying it is a single-object relation. 15  The explanation of why 
nociception yields essentially de se knowledge, if it works, should generalize to any other 
single-object relations. Focusing on bodily examples, Evans lists ‘our proprioceptive 
sense, our sense of balance, of heat and cold, and of pressure’ (1982: 220). The list 
plausibly also includes our way of knowing about our current thoughts, and our current 
actions. Accord explains why the knowledge single-object relations provide us with is 
essentially constituted by de se beliefs. 
 
I end this section by considering an objection to my explanation. It emerges from an 
influential point first made by Sydney Shoemaker.16  
 
                                                        
15 ‘Single-object faculty’ is used in Martin (1995) and O’ Brien (2007).  
16 See Shoemaker (1968). Shoemaker himself uses his point to defend a view about which judgments are 
immune to error through misidentification (IEM).   
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I emphasized that Accord is crucial to my treatment of Cognitive. But so, it turns out, is 
something else – the assumption that nociception is a single-object relation. This 
assumption might be contested. Perhaps there are metaphysically possible cases in which 
Ruth is sensitive to someone else’s pain in a way that is similar to the way she is sensitive 
to her own pain in Cognitive (i.e. she doesn’t have to observe any pain behavior). The 
same knowledge-yielding relation as is present in Cognitive is arguably also present in these 
cases. In Cognitive, Ruth stands in that relation to her own pain. In these cases, she stands 
in the same relation to someone else’s pain. On this view, the knowledge-yielding relation 
I have been calling nociception is, as Shoemaker might put it, only de facto a single-object 
relation. In our world, and in worlds at all like it, the only person whose pains Ruth can 
nociceive is Ruth. But in far-flung worlds a subject could nociceive other peoples’ 
pains.17 
 
My reply is that it is enough for my argument for ‘single object relation’ to mean de facto 
single-object relation.  
 
Suppose for the sake of argument that nociception, the knowledge-yielding relation in 
Cognitive, is merely a de facto single object relation.  
 
That doesn’t make the ‘Dever’s favourite author’ proposal about ‘t’ look any better. It 
remains the case that it is an accident that Ruth’s ‘Dever’s favorite author’ belief is about 
someone she can nociceive. Suppose Dever suddenly switches his favoritism to 
Hobsbawm, as he could easily do. It isn’t as though this switch will somehow trigger a 
reorganization of the universe such that, as soon as the change occurs, Ruth will stop 
nociceiving Ruth (Dever’s earlier favorite author) and start nociceiving Hobsbawm 
(Dever’s later favorite author). There is still a disconnect between the relation that yields 
knowledge and the belief’s hyperintensional profile. 
 
Just as importantly, supposing that nociception is merely de facto a single-object relation 
doesn’t make the de se proposal about ‘t’ look any worse. There might be far flung cases in 
which Ruth stands in the relation of nociception to the pains of someone other than 
Ruth. But, precisely because they are far flung, they don’t make it accidental that it is 
herself she stands in that relation to. So her ‘t’-belief will still be knowledge, on the de se 
proposal. One can have knowledge of one’s environment on the basis of perceptual 
experiences even if there are far flung cases in which one is envatted and matching 
perceptual experiences lead one to form false beliefs. The remote possibility of cases in 
which one is envatted doesn’t make it accidental that when it looks to one as though 
there is a chair with three legs in front of one, there really is. Similarly, Ruth’s de se belief 
is nociceptive knowledge, despite the far-flung possibility of her belief being about one 
thing (herself), and the thing she is in a position to gain knowledge of (the person she is 
hooked up to via nociception) being something else.  
 
Summary: The non-accidental truth requirement on knowledge doesn’t have anything to 
do with the de se in particular. Neither does Accord. But in conjunction with the fact that 
some of the relations we use to gain knowledge are single-object relations, Accord 
explains why sometimes, de se belief is essential for knowledge. In the next section, I 
argue that parallel non-accidentality considerations about action explain a connection 
between action and de se intention. 
                                                        




(III) Action and de se intention.  
 
How non-accidentality considerations explain the connection between action and de se 
intention is sensitive to what one’s view of intentional action (hereafter, action) is. I’ll 
first motivate the connection on what I call the knowledge view of action. I’ll then switch to 
what I call the causal view of action.  
 
Action and de se intention 1: the knowledge view of action   
 
Suppose you are dropping crumbs while eating cake, and someone brings the fact to 
your attention. You observe that you didn’t know that you were dropping crumbs. On the 
face of it, the force of the reply is that your dropping the crumbs wasn’t intentional. 
Partly motivated by this kind of case, some philosophers of action accept the view that 
intentionally φ–ing always involves knowledge of the fact that one is φ-ing and, 
moreover, this knowledge – ‘practical knowledge’ – is constituted by an intention you 
have that is directed at φ–ing. This package is what I am calling the knowledge view. If 
knowledge is always constituted by belief, then the knowledge view implies that intentions 
are a kind of belief, which is what Velleman’s (1989) version of the knowledge view says. If 
intentions are not beliefs, then the knowledge view implies that knowledge is not always 
constituted by belief, which is what Anscombe (1963), Setiya (2008) and Campbell’s 
(2018) versions say.  
 
Suppose Ruth intentionally φ’s. Given the knowledge view, she will know that she is φ–ing. 
It might be misleading to say that there is a faculty on the basis of which she knows. On 
the knowledge view the very intention on which she acts constitutes her knowledge of 
acting, so it isn’t as though the state that constitutes her knowledge tracks some 
independently existing entity, which might be read into talk of a ‘faculty’. But even on the 
knowledge view there is a relation to her own actions in virtue of which Ruth is in a position 
to have practical knowledge of them – it might just be the authoring relation. That relation 
is a single-object relation – the cases in which she stands in it to anyone else’s actions, if 
they are any, are very remote.  So Accord implies that the knowledge this relation makes 
available to her must be constituted by a de se state. According to the knowledge view, the 
knowledge is constituted by the intention she has that is directed at φ–ing. So this 
intention must be a de se state. Accord and the knowledge view jointly imply that Ruth’s 
intentionally φ–ing involves a de se intention directed at φ–ing.  
 
All the advocates of the knowledge view I’ve mentioned – Anscombe, Campbell, Setiya, 
Velleman – take for granted that practical knowledge is de se. This is natural enough. The 
intuition we have about intentionally dropping crumbs is that, if someone is doing it, 
they will have knowledge they would express with the sentence ‘I am dropping crumbs’. 
But even if it is obvious that practical knowledge of our own actions is de se, there is an 
explanatory question about why it must be. Accord, together with the point that the 
relation one stands in to one’s actions is a single-object relation, answers that question. It 
explains why practical knowledge must be de se. If the knowledge view is correct, this 
converts into an explanation of why intentional action always involves de se intention, the 
connecting thought being that practical knowledge is constituted by intention. If the 





Action and de se intention 2: the causal view of action 
 
Perhaps intentional action is action that is caused in the right kind of way by an intention.18 
And perhaps it is possible for an intention to cause action in the right kind of way 
without the agent having knowledge of what they are doing. Is rejecting the knowledge view 
and accepting this causal view a way of resisting the need for de se intention? I claim it isn’t, 
on the grounds that without de se intention, the following non-accidentality condition on 
intentional action would be violated:  
 
Non-accidental satisfaction: If one intentionally acts, then there is an intention one 
acts on whose satisfaction is not accidental.  
That there is a reading on which this condition is true is built into the causal view. If a 
climber’s intentionally dropping another climber involves a dropping of the other 
climber that is caused, in the right kind of way, by an intention directed at dropping the 
other climber then intentionally dropping another climber will involve an intention 
whose satisfaction is in one sense not accidental – the intention causes the dropping, and 
the dropping is the thing the satisfaction of the intention requires. The thing that needs 
to be shown is that someone who accepts the causal view should say that the condition is 
true on a reading that implies that, whenever there is intentional action, there will be de se 
intention.  
 
I repeat Conative from above:  
 
Conative: Ruth lacks any non-trivial identity knowledge concerning herself. She 
has just moved a step backward. This resulted from something conative 
happening. She formed an intention whose satisfaction-condition is <Ruth, takes 
a step backward>.  
Some remarks about time are in order. Conative need not be a case in which Ruth formed 
an intention at some earlier point, and stored it up for control of future action. Much 
intentional action is spontaneous. The only intention she has may be an intention formed 
as she begins to act. We should also assume that the intention has an appropriate 
temporal component – Ruth would express it ‘now’ rather than ‘3pm’ for example. 
 
As noted above, we seem to have a strong intuition that if Conative is a case in which 
Ruth intentionally takes a step backward then the intention she formed will be one that 
she would express with ‘I take a step backward’ rather than e.g. ‘Ruth takes a step 
backward’. I want to explain why this is so by reference to a plausible non-accidental 
satisfaction requirement on intentional action.  
 
The strategy is parallel to the strategy used in the previous section in relation to Cognitive. 
I use the sentence ‘t takes a step backward’ to refer to Ruth’s intention. I begin by 
looking at the perhaps ridiculous proposal that ‘t’ picks Ruth out because she is Dever’s 
favorite author. I’ll argue that on this proposal the satisfaction of the intention is 
implausibly accidental. I’ll then argue that, as was the case in Cognitive, and for a 
structurally identical reason, to get a better proposal we need to accept that ‘t’ is de se. 
Finally, I’ll argue that the point generalizes from the action involved in Conative to actions 
across the board.  
                                                        
18 See Davidson (1980) for a classic statement of the causal view.  
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Suppose the Dever’s favorite author hypothesis about ‘t’ is correct. Ruth’s ‘t takes a step 
backward’-intention is non-accidentally satisfied, in that it is an early point in a causal 
chain that leads up to the very thing that its satisfaction in fact requires – a certain 
movement of Ruth’s body. (Similarly, even on the Dever’s favorite author hypothesis about 
Ruth’s ‘t is in pain’ belief, that belief was part of a causal chain an earlier point in which 
was the thing that its truth in fact requires, Ruth’s being in pain.) But the intention is 
merely accidentally satisfied in that the later point in the causal chain that its satisfaction 
in fact involves could easily have been irrelevant to its satisfaction. The movement of 
Ruth’s body would have been irrelevant if Hobsbawm had been Dever’s favorite author. 
In that case, the satisfaction of an intention with the proposed hyperintensional profile 
would have required a movement of Hobsbawm’s body, not Ruth’s.  
Taking a step backward is comfortably within Ruth’s behavioral range. So, on the correct 
proposal about ‘t’, we should be able to explain why her ‘t takes a step backward’ 
intention gets satisfied just by noting that Ruth formed it, and nothing funny has 
happened (e.g. Ruth’s body is not suddenly paralyzed, nobody grips Ruth’s legs just as 
she is about to move them).  
The Dever’s favorite author hypothesis about ‘t’ is incompatible with this. In order to explain 
why the intention gets satisfied, on that hypothesis about it, the fact that Ruth is Dever’s 
favorite author needs to be mentioned. Why? The crucial point is that there is one body, 
her own, that Ruth’s intention has its most immediate impact on. It is not an accident 
that, if Ruth forms the intention to take a step backward, the next thing that happens is 
that her own body moves in such a way as to take a step backward. By contrast, it is 
accidental that, if Ruth forms an intention to move a step backward, the next thing that 
happens is that Dever’s favorite author’s body moves in such a way as to take a step 
backward. Granted that Ruth is Dever’s favorite author, when Ruth’s body moves, 
Dever’s favorite author’s body moves. But, it isn’t as though, if Dever suddenly came to 
prefer Hobsbawm over Millikan, as could easily happen, the universe would reorganize 
itself such that, now, Ruth’s intentions have their immediate impact not on Ruth’s body 
but on Hobsbawm’s.  
By contrast, on the de se hypothesis about ‘t’, it isn’t accidental that the intention causes 
the very thing that its satisfaction requires. Single-object relations, as I defined them, 
were epistemic relations. The immediate impact relation is a motor relation. But it shares 
a structural property with single-object relations. It is a relation that, at least de facto, each 
of us only stands in to herself. So, if Ruth has an intention that hooks onto her because she 
is the subject of the intention, and that has its impact via the immediate impact relation, it’s 
not accidental that the person the intention is about – the person movement of whose 
leg would constitute the satisfaction of the intention – is the very person whose body the 
intention impacts on.  
 
Suppose that explanation of why Ruth’s intention in Conative needs to be de se is accepted. 
How far does the point generalize? Can we conclude that intentional action always 
depends on de se intention?  
 
Nothing I said about Conative seems sensitive to the predicative component of the 
intention – ‘takes a step backward’. It doesn’t make a difference if we switch to a case 
where Ruth acts not on a ‘t takes a step backward’ intention but on ‘t takes a step 
forward’ or ‘t does a pirouette’ intention. The immediate impact relation seems equally 
relevant to these intentions, so the case that the intention acted on needs to be de se is the 
same. The point doesn’t even seem special to the intentions involved in bodily, as 
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opposed to mental, actions. Suppose Ruth forms an intention to visualize the first three 
rooms of the National Gallery. The next thing that happens is that somebody’s stream of 
consciousness becomes populated with visual imaginings of the first three rooms of the 
National Gallery. It isn’t an accident that it is Ruth’s stream of consciousness in which 
this happens (even if there are far flung cases in which it is someone else’s). On the face 
of it, the immediate impact relation is relevant for all intentional actions. That is the 
initial case for thinking that there is the same need for de se intention whenever one 
intentionally does anything: intentionally φ–ing always involves a de se intention that one 
φ (a.k.a. an intention to φ).19 The case is strengthened by considered an objection in the 
next section.  
 
Summary: Much about intentional action is controversial. The knowledge view and the 
causal view are fairly different pictures of the nature of a subject’s relationship to her own 
actions. But, on either view, there is a strong case that we need de se intentions whenever 
we intentionally do anything. Non-accidentality considerations can explain why.  
 (IV) Comparison with other positions: a reply to the skeptics 
 
Castañeda, Lewis and Perry made the idea of the de se and of essential indexicality 
famous. Subsequently, there has been a bit of a backlash against their idea  – two of the 
three papers I’ll discuss in this section have the word ‘myth’ in their title. The interest of 
the current paper does not depend on how well-motivated this backlash is. Cases like 
Cognitive and Conative raise explanatory questions that demand answers and that haven’t 
already received them. Even so, it’s natural to wonder whether non-accidentality 
considerations – relied on in the previous three sections of this paper to try to answer the 
explanatory questions Cognitive and Conative raise – might also provide a plausible reply to 
the authors who constitute the anti-essential indexical backlash. I’ll argue they can.  
 
The main authors of interest here are: Ruth Millikan, Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever 
(C&D hereafter), and Ofra Magidor. Between the three of them (counting C&D as one), 
I think we can identify two main views. One view is explored by Millikan and C&D but 
not Magidor. The other is explored by C&D and Magidor, but not Millikan.  
C&D characterize the overarching position they accept as follows:  
There is no philosophically distinctive role to be played by perspectivality in the 
explanation of action, inquiry, or perception. (2013: 2) 
The two views C&D appeal in support of this position are both present in their 
discussion of a passage they quote from Perry. Perry writes:  
Consider a transaction with a fax machine. To press certain buttons on it, I have 
to move my fingers a certain distance and direction from me. It isn’t enough to 
know where the buttons were relative to one another, or where the fax machine 
was in the building or room. I had to know where these things were relative to 
me. (1998: 87) 
                                                        
19 Some argue that the intention to φ and the intention that one φ are two different, albeit both de se, 
intentions (see Recanati 2007). I disagree (see Morgan forthcoming). But the disagreement is orthogonal to 
the current discussion. Even if there are two intentions, each has the same satisfaction-conditions and in 
each case the satisfaction-conditions involve the subject because they are the subject. I’ve argued that Ruth 
must have an intention that has both of these properties. She requires a de se intention. She may not require 
either subspecies of de se intention in particular, if there really are two subspecies.  
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C&D’s comment on the passage is as follows:  
Millikan is right, and importantly so, in pointing out that there’s not even the 
beginning of an argument for anything properly labeled “essential indexicality” 
here. If anything is shown, it has to do with something like what Millikan calls an 
“active self-name” and it need not be indexical. However, we think that even the 
claim about the “active self-name” (or “de se concept”, if you prefer that label) is 
unsupported. Why think that the agent had to represent herself at all in order to 
push the button? (2013: 45)  
The first part of the comment (before ‘However’) is motivated by the view that C&D 
share with Millikan – I’ll call it the self-name view. The second part of the comment (after 
‘However’) is motivated by the view C&D share with Magidor – I’ll call it the worldly states 
view. This section considers each in turn.  
 (1) The self-name view: Millikan and C &D: 
Suppose we accept that de se states have some distinctive property – e.g. being essential to 
knowledge yielded by single-object relations, being involved in any intentional action at 
all. Does anything interesting follow about indexical states? Only if de se states are 
indexical states. But that might be contested. The word used to express de se states – ‘I’ – 
is indexical. But perhaps indexicality is just a property of some words that theorists have 
incautiously projected onto the thoughts those words express. De se thoughts could be 
thoughts with a characteristic linguistic expression (the indexical ‘I’), perhaps also some 
kind of special relation to knowledge and action (gestured at by Millikan’s phrase ‘active 
self-name’), but not themselves be indexical. Instead, they involve names. 
The self-name view: A de se state of S’s involves a name of S and is not indexical.  
 
C&D express approval of the self-name view, but they don’t provide their own discussion 
of it. Hence, I’ll focus on Millikan’s presentation. She writes:   
My mental "I", my @"RM", is not an indexical. More reasonably it is a (Millian) 
name for me, your "I", which may well have quite a different mental shape, is a 
(Millian) name for you (1990:732). 
She also supplies definitions for ‘(Millian) name’ and ‘indexical’. A (Millian) name is a 
sign ‘about the semantics of which nothing can be said beyond that it is a name with 
such and such a referent’ (1990: 732 fn 9). An indexical is a sign ‘that has no constant 
referent, no referent qua sign type’ (1990:724). 
 
I’ve argued that non-accidentality considerations provide reason to accept that the 
hyperintensional profile of a de se state is that it is about someone because they are its subject. 
But is there any reason to think that this is incompatible with Millikan’s position? 
Couldn’t someone think the following: 
Millikan is correct that Ruth’s de se state involves a (Millian) name for Ruth. That is just 
to say that the whole story about the semantics of (the singular component of) the state 
is:  
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 It is about Ruth 
But taking that view about the state’s semantics in no way constrains our options in 
saying what its hyperintensional profile is (or forces us to say it doesn’t have one). We 
still want to know:  ‘Why is the state about Ruth?’. And we can still answer:  ‘It is about 
Ruth because Ruth is the subject of it’. Given Millikan’s view, this answer won’t describe 
the state’s semantics (as it would be if the state were indexical). But it can still be the 
correct answer and, in particular, a correct description of its metasemantics.20 
 
This irenic suggestion doesn’t work. To bring out why not, it helps to consider a possible 
‘no fact of the matter’ view about the issue Millikan raises.  
Ruth’s token of the word ‘I’ is a token of a (linguistic) indexical sign. That, by Millikan’s 
definition of ‘indexical’, is because it is a token of a sign that has no constant referent: when 
other English speakers produce the same sound, with a different referent, that counts as 
them using the same sign.  
Does a de se state of Ruth’s involve a token of a (mental) indexical sign? That, by 
Millikan’s definition of ‘indexical’, depends on whether it is a token of a sign that has no 
constant referent. Different peoples’ de se states clearly have different referents. So the issue of 
whether de se states are indexical turns on whether different peoples’ de se states involve 
the same sign. 
The relevant ‘no fact of the matter’ view is the view that whether we say different 
peoples’ de se states involve the same sign – hence whether we say they are indexical – is up 
to us. We can group intentional tokens into sign types in whatever way we please.  
Millikan must reject this view. Her denial of mental indexicality is intended to bust a 
myth, not to be an optional reformulation of agreed facts. There is also a plausible basis 
for rejecting it. We should acknowledge single signs corresponding to natural sets of 
intentional tokens (e.g. all tokens of the word ‘I’) but not to gerrymandered sets (e.g. all 
tokens of the word ‘I’, the first token in this paragraph of the word ‘myth’, and Ruth’s 
most intensely held de se belief).  
 
However, characterizing the issue in this way makes it clear that there is a prima facie case 
for accepting that there is a single sign corresponding to different peoples’ de se states.  
As sets of intentional entities go, the set of de se states seems highly natural. It is the set 
of: all the states that Millikan is trying to bust a myth about; all the states that bear a 
‘special connection’ to the first-person pronoun; all the states that involve what Millikan 
calls ‘active self-names’. If Millikan nevertheless denies the set corresponds to a single 
sign, there needs to be some difference between, say, my de se states and Ruth’s de se 
states to justify that denial. Difference in hyperintensional profile could play this role. 
Suppose that Ruth’s de se states hooked onto Ruth for one reason and mine hooked onto 
me for some completely different reason. Then, Millikan could say, the things different 
subjects’ de se states have in common – e.g. linguistic expression – mask underlying 
differences – in hyperintensional profile – that justify the refusal to accept they all 
                                                        
20 Millikan mentions in a footnote (1990:732 fn 9) that she wants to give a teleosemantic account of how 




correspond to a single sign. But that way of justifying the refusal is not available if a de se 
state is about its subject because they are its subject – in that case, my de se state is about 
me for the very same reason that Ruth’s de se state is about her. There is no other way I 
can see of justifying the refusal. So, I conclude, the irenic suggestion doesn’t work. If it’s 
true that a de se state is about its subject because they are its subject, then it’s also true 
that different peoples’ de se states involve the same sign. This sign clearly lacks a constant 
reference. So it is an indexical and not a (Millian) name.21  
 
Summary: We should reject the self-name view. The next section argues that we should 
reject the other main view that anti-essential indexical authors have appealed to.  
 
(2) The worldly states view: C&D and Magidor 
In (III), I offered an explanation of why Ruth’s <Ruth, takes a step backward> intention 
in Conative must be de se.  I then argued that the point was not sensitive to the predicative 
component of the intention – that that component was ‘takes a step backward’ rather 
than e.g. ‘does a pirouette’ or ‘visually imagines the first three rooms in the National 
Gallery’. What about the singular component? The argument surely did rely on the fact 
that the intention had satisfaction-conditions that involved the agent. If an intention 
doesn’t – if it is worldly rather than self-directed – then it can’t be de se. Strictly speaking, all 
my argument did was show that, if an action is the result of a self-directed intention, non-
accidentality considerations give us reason to think the intention must be de se. To 
conclude that every action involves de se intention, we need the premise that every action 
involves self-directed intention. The worldly states view implies that this premise is false.  
The worldly states view: Some intentional actions do not involve any self-directed 
states at all.  
In this section, I’ll say, first, what the intuitive case that intentional action always involves 
self-directed intention is and, then, why the guiding analogy defenders of the worldly states 
view appeal to in order to defend their contrary claim is unpersuasive.       
                                                        
21C&D use the word ‘indexical’ (which Millikan does) and the word ‘perspectival’ (which Millikan doesn’t). 
Might the two words mean something different? Might someone be persuaded that de se states are indexical 
but still insist that de se states are not perspectival?  
 I don’t give separate consideration to the view that de se states are not perspectival for two 
reasons.  
First, it’s natural to understand ‘indexical’ and ‘perspectival’ as synonyms. For example, Adrian 
Moore, in his book length study of perspectival representation, offers the following as an initial gloss on 
the notion: ‘The content of a perspectival representation depends not only on its type, but also on the 
point of view from which it is produced’.(1997:11). This is very close to Millikan’s gloss on ‘indexical’. C 
&D themselves freely alternate between  ‘indexical’ and ‘perspectival’.  E.g. the heading of their section 1.2. 
is ‘Our Target: The Almost Universally Accepted View that Indexicality is Philosophically Deep’ while the 
first line of that section is ‘This book is an extended exploration and defense of the view that 
perspectivality is philosophically shallow’ (see 2013: 2). 
Second, suppose someone tells us ‘perspectival’ doesn’t mean indexical. That alone doesn’t make 
the view that de se states are not perspectival one that needs to be engaged with. We would first need to 
hear: what different thing ‘perspectival’ means; why de se states being indexical doesn’t guarantee their also 
being perspectival; what the initial case for thinking they aren’t perspectival is; and why their not being 
perspectival should be regarded as news. So I take it to be reasonable to think the only view in this area 




We’ve already seen C&D’s discussion of Perry’s fax machine case and their claim that 
there is no reason to think that the agent ‘had to represent herself at all in order to push 
the button’. So they think that pushing the button on a fax machine is an example of the 
kind of action the worldly states view claims is possible.22  
Magidor offers the following case:  
Suppose that I believe that people in Africa are starving, that when money is 
donated to Oxfam this prevents people from starving, and that preventing people 
from starving is a good thing. Suppose that as a result of holding these beliefs, I 
go ahead and donate money to Oxfam. This seems like a clear case of an 
intentional action. Note that at least as I have described the case, no first-
personal beliefs were involved…. It is thus far from clear that so called de se 
attitudes play the unique or distinctive role with respect to action that defenders 
of the myth commonly attribute to them (2015:259). 23 
Magidor’s initial idea is that, since the subject need not have any self-directed beliefs at 
all, they need not, in particular, have any de se self-directed belief. Perhaps that is right. 
But her ultimate conclusion – after the ellipses – concerns attitudes in general rather than 
beliefs in particular. That conclusion wouldn’t be supported by the case (the only one 
Magidor discusses) if the subject of the case didn’t need a self-directed belief but did 
need a self-directed intention, and it had to be de se. So, Magidor is committed to denying 
that the subject needs a self-directed intention. There surely will be some intention behind 
their action (It isn’t in general true that merely believing something to be good causes one to act 
in such a way as to bring it about. There are too many conflicting believed-to-be-good 
things for that to be so.). If the case supports the worldly states view, this intention will 
have to be a worldly intention – e.g. the intention that money is donated to Oxfam. 
In the example of action I discussed – Conative, where Ruth’s goal involved Ruth taking a 
step backward – the agent was a constitutive part of the goal. In the examples of action 
C&D and Magidor discuss – e.g. a case in which the goal is that a fax message is sent, or 
one in which the goal is that Oxfam is donated to – the agent isn’t part of the goal. Does 
this difference make a difference to the need for a self-directed intention?  
There’s an intuitive case that it doesn’t. Even in the case of actions of mine in which I 
am not involved as part of the goal, I am involved as the instrument. If I do something 
then, of course, I do something. E.g., suppose Ofra intentionally brings it about that 
Oxfam is donated to. There will be some more specific means by which she pulls this 
off. E.g. suppose we are told she does it by donating to Oxfam herself. Aren’t we now in a 
position to say that Ofra will have formed an intention to donate to Oxfam? Worldly 
intentions seem possible. But they seem to lead to action only via self-directed intentions. 
The guiding analogy  
The defenders of the worldly states view resist this. They appeal to an analogy. Here is how 
Magidor puts it:  
                                                        
22 They discuss a variety of other cases. E.g. they suggest that someone (e.g. a publisher) might act on the 
worldly intention ‘Kripke releases his unpublished papers’, without having any self-directed intention. 
(2013:51).  
23 See Magidor (2015:259).  
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Suppose in order to lift my hand, I must first shift my shoulder blade. It does not 
seem that I cannot intentionally lift my hand without also having the belief that 
in order to lift my hand I need to shift my shoulder blade: even intentional 
actions are ultimately achieved via other actions, ones that are more basic or 
direct, rather than being the result of some process of thought. In a similar 
manner, reaching into my pocket in order to donate money might be such a more 
basic or direct action (2015:259).  
Sometimes one does one thing in a way that involves doing something else where one 
has no thought – e.g. no belief, no intention – directed at the second thing. The familiar 
case Magidor points to is: one lifts one’s hand in a way that involves shifting one’s 
shoulder blade but one has no thought directed at the shoulder blade shift. One doesn’t 
believe anything like ‘Shifting this shoulder-blade thusly is needed to lift my hand’, or intend 
anything like ‘This shoulder blade moves thusly’.24 
The following is what needs to be possible if the Oxfam case is to undermine the claim 
that action always depends on self-directed intention:  Ofra forms a worldly intention 
that Oxfam is donated to. As a result of this intention, she intentionally does something. 
This is despite the fact that she lacks any self-directed intention. In particular, she lacks 
an intention to donate money (which would be self-directed even without the ‘reaching into 
my pocket’ part). Ofra brings it about that Oxfam is donated to via donating herself (as 
opposed to, for example, convincing someone else to donate). But – and here is the 
guiding analogy – Ofra’s donating is a non-intentional action via which she does 
something else intentionally (bringing it about that Oxfam is donated to), just like her 
shifting her shoulder blade is a non-intentional action via which she does something else 
intentionally (lifting her hand).  
I’ll argue that this self-directed intention free route to action is not possible in two stages. 
First (i), I’ll argue that even if we were to accept that the route is possible, that wouldn’t 
make a difference to whether Ofra needs a self-directed conative state that hooks onto 
her because she is its subject. On either route to action – self-directed intention involving 
or self-directed intention free – there is such a state.  The outstanding controversy is 
whether this state has to be a person-level intention. I’ll argue that it does – (ii).  
(i) Magidor draws an analogy between the case she is interested in and a familiar case. 
But she doesn’t say much about the familiar case. It helps to say something. When I lift 
my hand by shifting my shoulder blade I don’t have an intention directed at the shoulder 
blade shift. But a sub-personal conative state – a motor command – certainly is involved. 
It isn’t magic that my shoulder blade does the very thing it needs to do if my intention to 
lift my hand is to be satisfied.25 
A motor command whose satisfaction-conditions are <This shoulder-blade, shifts 
thusly> is arguably not self-directed. A shoulder-blade is at best a small part of a self. But, if 
Magidor were right that the Oxfam case might work in the same way as the hand-lifting 
case, the satisfaction-conditions of the corresponding motor command in the Oxfam 
case would have to be: <Ofra, donates to Oxfam>. Such a motor command would be 
self-directed. Moreover, it would have its impact via the immediate impact relation. So, 
the case based on non-accidentality considerations that it would have to be about Ofra 
                                                        
24 C&D appeal to the same point at (2013:43). To avoid repetition, I focus on Magidor’s discussion.  
25 See Jeannerod (2006: ch 1) for discussion of the role of motor commands in intentional action.  
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because she is its subject is the same case, discussed in section III, as if it had been a self-
directed intention. That case isn’t sensitive to the person-level/subpersonal distinction. 
(ii) I’ve just argued that, even if the analogy with the hand-lifting case worked, and Ofra 
had no self-directed intention, she would still have a self-directed conative state. More 
particularly, she would have a conative state with the satisfaction-conditions <Ofra, 
donates to Oxfam> that hooks onto Ofra because she is its subject. 26  The outstanding 
controversy is whether this conative state must be a (person-level) intention as opposed 
to a (subpersonal) motor command. I’ll argue that it must be an intention.  
Suppose Ofra has just intentionally lifted her hand and we ask her how she lifted her hand 
(e.g. did it involve the shoulder blade moving, or does the action get directed just 
involving parts of her arm below the level of her elbow). It’s entirely possible that she 
may have nothing very informative to say. ‘I just did it’ or ‘I just did it: whatever needed 
to happen with my body did happen’ or ‘I just did it: I’m not a physiologist’.  
Suppose Ofra has just brought it about that Oxfam is donated to by donating herself and 
we ask her how she brought it about that Oxfam is donated to (e.g. did it involve her 
donating herself, did it involve her persuading someone else to donate?).  If Ofra’s self-
directed conative state is subpersonal, it ought to be possible that she exhibits a 
comparable level of ignorance: ‘I just brought that about, who knows how’ or ‘I just 
brought it about: some relevant means will have been selected; I can’t say which’. That 
really doesn’t seem believable. Ofra’s focus may, as she donated, have been entirely on 
Oxfam’s need and not on her own role in catering to it. That she catered to that need by 
donating herself may not have involved any protracted deliberation, and other ways of 
catering to the same need – e.g. via persuading someone else to donate – may not have 
occurred to her. All the same, Ofra has a conative state whose satisfaction-conditions are 
<Ofra, donates to Oxfam>. And we seem to be confident that this is a state that Ofra 
could in principle access via introspection. Being such as to be in principle accessible by 
introspection is a marker of being a person level state as opposed to a subpersonal one.27 
Another marker of being a person level state is being poised to play a role in reasoning. 
Again, Ofra’s conative state seems poised to play a role in reasoning. If Ofra is in this 
state then she will not pursue further deliberations about how to bring it about that 
Oxfam is donated to. But, if the state were subpersonal, there’s no reason why being in it 
should arrest her person level deliberation on that question.  
Summary: Intention is the most challenging state-type for the worldly states view. It’s 
plausible that we can form worldly intentions. The difficulty is to see how they could lead 
to action otherwise than by leading to self-directed intentions (the hand-lifting analogy 
does not make this easier to see, I have argued). If they can’t, then any case of action, 
whether or not its ultimate goal is worldly, will involve self-directed intention. Hence, 





                                                        
26 Is this already incompatible with the worldly states view’s treatment of the case? That depends on whether 
the view involves denying the need for person level self-directed states, or the need for any self-directed 
states. Magidor doesn’t make the distinction. C&D do. They deny the need for states that represent the 
subject whether these are ‘conscious or subpersonal’ (see 2013:43).  




Thought about the self can be mind-boggling. Methodologically, it makes sense to 
approach the topic armed with general principles that have been supported using 
examples from a different domain. In this paper, the general principles are non-
accidentality conditions on knowledge and intentional action. It is a fact that we have a 
special epistemic perspective on ourselves – even if it turns out there are far flung cases 
where we have the same perspective on someone else. It is a fact that we have a special 
motor perspective on ourselves – even if it turns out there are far flung cases where we 
have the same perspective on someone else. We exploit the epistemic perspective 
whenever we gain knowledge on the basis of single-object relations, and we exploit the 
motor perspective whenever we intentionally do anything. Non-accidentality conditions 
on knowledge and on intentional action explain why exploiting these perspectives always 
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